BMOKidnapping41ForeignNationalsAlgeria

Moktar Belmoktar, the leader of the al-Mulathameen [The Masked Ones] Brigades, has been a high profile Algerian jihadist leader for most of his life, becoming known as a canny and entrepreneurial strategist and a master smuggler.

Known by the nom de guerre "Khalid Abu al-Abbas," Belmoktar is a former leader of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), as well as of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In late 2012, Belmoktar separated from AQIM, and his al-Mulathameen Brigades began operating independently. Their first major attack, at In Aménas, signals their intent to continue waging war against Algerian and Western targets in the region.

Following is a profile of the jihadist, focusing on his trajectory from teenage recruit in Afghanistan to the leader of an organization which carried out the most catastrophic terrorist attack to date on a gas or oil facility in North Africa. The document particularly focuses on notable attacks linked to Belmoktar and his involvement with previous GSPC and AQIM kidnapping operations.

Introduction: In Aménas Attack

Shortly before 6:00 am local time on January 16, 2013, about forty militants attacked two buses leaving a natural gas facility operated by the Algerian state oil company, Sonatrach, British Petroleum, and the Norwegian Statoil firm. Killing a security guard, the attackers stormed past the gates of the compound. Once inside the facility, they placed explosives and took dozens of residents hostage in a wing of the living quarters. Many more workers remained hidden in their quarters and throughout the complex. The Algerian military quickly laid siege to the plant, and attacked militants attempting to leave with hostages. After four days, during which the attackers threatened to execute their hostages and destroy the facility, the Algerian army stormed the complex on January 19, 2013. Algerian Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal subsequently announced that at least 38 civilians and 29 militants had died during the attack, with five remaining missing, and 100 freed.[1] Moreover, Sellal asserted that the operation had been planned with the intent to seize foreigners as hostages. Reflecting this aim, the militants attempted to remove some of their captives from the facility on January 17, 2013 and were disrupted by an Algerian attack on the forming convoy.

Heading the operation, the jihadist Moktar Belmoktar claimed responsibility for the attacks in a two-minute and six-second video that was posted online on January 21. In the video, which was dated to January 17, Belmoktar demanded the cessation of the French intervention in Mali and offered to exchange American hostages for the release of high-profile jihadist prisoners Omar Abdul Rahman and Aafia Siddique.

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Moktar Belmoktar, the leader of the al-Mulathameen [The Masked Ones] Brigades, has been a high profile Algerian jihadist leader for most of his life, becoming known as a canny and entrepreneurial strategist and a master smuggler. Known by the nom de guerre "Khalid Abu al-Abbas," Belmoktar is a former leader of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), as well as of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In late 2012, Belmoktar separated from AQIM, and his al-Mulathameen Brigades began operating independently.[2] Their first major attack, at In Aménas, signals their intent to continue waging war against Algerian and Western targets in the region.

The In Aménas attack was not a unique or new style in Belmoktar's strategy. In the decade preceding the operation at In Aménas, Belmoktar has been associated with nearly half a dozen GSPC and AQIM kidnapping operations targeting Westerners in the area. Notably, hostages linked to Belmoktar have largely survived and been released, most likely after significant ransoms were exchanged.[3] Particularly known for kidnapping operations targeting Westerners, Belmoktar collected millions of dollars from the ransoms, which additionally generated operating funds for north African jihadists.

Belmoktar's connections to jihadist activity goes back to the Afghan war in the 80's; his involvement with GIA, GSPC, and AQIM extends nearly as far, as he became in the Algerian jihad after returning from Afghanistan in the early 1990s. He has been repeatedly sentenced in absentia by the Algerian government, with Algerian courts passing down judgments in 2004, 2007, and 2008 for charges including forming terrorist groups, robbery, detention, use of illegal weapons, kidnapping foreigners, importing and trafficking in illegal weapons, and the murder of 13 Algerian customs officers.[4]

By the end of 2012, Belmoktar had separated from AQIM and his al-Mulathameen Brigades began operating as a distinct jihadist group. Addressing the separation in a December 2012 video message titled "Our Shariah, Loyalty, and Steadfastness Until Victory," he announced the group's continued adherence to a jihadist ideology, as well as their intent to target the countries engaged in the intervention in Mali. Their first major attack, at In Aménas, indicates their intent to continue waging war against Algerian and Western targets in the region.

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The following is a profile of Moktar Belmoktar, focusing on his jihadist trajectory from teenage recruit in Afghanistan to the leader of an organization which carried out the most catastrophic terrorist attack to date on a gas or oil facility in North Africa.[5] The profile particularly focuses on notable attacks linked to Belmoktar and his involvement with previous GSPC and AQIM kidnapping operations.

Kidnapping for Ransom

Belmoktar has been deeply involved in the GSPC and AQIM's kidnapping operations against Westerners in the area. In the years preceding the In Aménas attack, Belmoktar gained an international reputation as a pragmatic leader who was particularly gifted at raising funds for the jihadists in North Africa through smuggling operations and high-payoff kidnappings. These kidnappings largely sought to seize valuable Western targets whose ransom could range into the millions of dollars. In many of the kidnappings, the hostages were seized while traveling around the Sahara in both guided and unguided caravans. However, perhaps indicating that the al-Mulathameen Brigades are increasingly comfortable operating even in areas of government strength, in January 2011 the group sized two French citizens in the Nigerien capital of Niamey.

He has directly asserted his intent to continue attacking Western targets through the newly independent al-Mulathameen Brigades. In his December 5, 2012 address, Belmoktar he issued a broad announcement that the al-Mulathameen Brigades: "threaten[s] everyone who participated in and planned for the aggression against our Muslim people due to their implementing the Islamic Shariah on our land.... we will attack your interests, and after today we will not remain hostages to your policies and psychological and media war."

Indeed, a month after issuing the blanket threat against Western interests in North Africa and around the world, Belmoktar lead the In Aménas attack, taking nearly eight hundred Algerian and foreign hostages. Forty-nine hostages were killed during the course of the attack, including ten Japanese citizens, eight Filipinos, five Norwegians, five British citizens, three Americans, two Malaysians, two Romanians, an Algerian, a Colombian, and a French citizen.[6]

In order to understand Belmoktar's tactics and strategies, as well as how he most likely viewed the possible results from In Aménas, the following section details previous kidnapping operations that have been tied to Belmoktar. Within these attacks, he filled an array of roles, ranging from operational leader to hostage negotiator.

February 2003: The GSPC kidnapped 32 European tourists, half of them Germans, who had been traveling in separate groups across the Algerian desert.7 17 of the hostages were freed by Algerian forces on May 15, 2003.8 The rest, with the exception of a German woman who died in captivity, were released in August 2003.9 GSPC leaders claimed to have received a significant ransom.[10] Belmoktar was reportedly "central" to both the kidnappings and the negotiations.[11]

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February 2008: Austrian tourists Wolfgang Ebner and Andrea Kloiber were kidnapped by AQIM in Tunisia on February 22, 2008. The two were subsequently held in Mali until their release on October 30, 2008.[12] Belmoktar has been named as the "key figure" in negotiating the final ransom for both tourists.[13]

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December 2008: Canadian diplomats Robert Fowler --then Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Niger -- and Louis Guay were kidnapped by Belmoktar's fighters on December 14, 2008. On April 22, 2009, after 130 days in captivity, the two men were released in exchange for the Malian government freeing four AQIM prisoners and a significant ransom14 of about $8 million dollars.[15]

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While negotiating the terms of Fowler and Guay's release, Belmoktar also parlayed for the simultaneous release of two European women kidnapped by a separate AQIM cell.[17] The Europeans, German citizen Marianne Petzold and Swiss citizen Gabriella Greiner, were kidnapped on January 22, 2009 along with British citizen Edward Dyer and Werner Greiner. On May 31, 2009 Dyer was killed by a cell commanded by another AQIM leader, Abelhamid Abu Zeid;[18] Werner Greiner was released on July 12, 2009.[19]

November 2009: AQIM kidnapped three Spanish aid workers in Mali after their vehicle was separated from an aid convoy that was traveling between Mauritania's capital, Nouakchott, and the country's second largest city, Nouahibou.[20] The victims, Albert Vilalta, Alicia Gamez, and Roque Pacual, were held hostage by Belmoktar.[21] Gamez was released on March 3, 2010, with Pacual and Vilalta released on August 22, 2010.

Belmoktar was pictured along with the two Spanish men[22] in images released in November 2011:

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January 2011: Belmoktar claimed responsibility for kidnaping French citizens Vincent Delory and Antoine De Leocour from a restaurant in Niamey, Niger on January 7, 2011.[23] Both men were killed within days, after French and Nigerien special forces attempted to free them.[24]

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In conclusion, the previous section has described five GSPC and AQIM kidnappings closely tied to Moktar Belmoktar's jihadist activity. The release of many of hostages underscores Belmoktar's role in raising funds for AQIM. However, the deaths of Delory and Leocour indicate that the organization has proved willing to execute hostages in retaliation for military operations against the group. Moreover, in the kidnapping operations underscore his ability to operate throughout the North African region, as captives have been seized in Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and Tunisia.

Belmoktar's Decades-Long Activity In The Jihadist Movement

Born in 1972 [25] in the north-central Algerian city of Ghardaïa, located along the M'zab Valley of the Sahara desert, [26] Belmoktar has been active in the jihadist movement from a young age, going back to his participation in the first Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Belmoktar has pointed the assassination of Abdullah Azzam, the jihadist ideologue and spiritual leader for Usama bin Laden, on November 29, 1989 in Peshawar, Pakistan as a critical moment in his radicalization, after which he was motivated to avenge the death of the scholar.[27]

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Joining other Arab jihadists in Afghanistan in the 1990s, Belmoktar claimed to have attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and have participated in combat, losing an eye during a fight with the Soviet Union.[29]

In 1992 or 1993, he returned to Algeria and quickly moved up in the ranks of the Algerian jihadist movement. In 1993, Belmoktar formed the "Katibat al-Shahada" or Martyr's Brigades in Ghardaïa, his home city.[30] The brigades, with an operational sphere in the Sahara, was subsequently incorporated into the Armed Islamic Group31 (GIA, from Groupe Islamic Armé).[32] Belmoktar has asserted that he was in contact with al-Qaeda leadership during the 1990s and initiating contact with the group during al-Qaeda's period of residence in Sudan.[33]

A group of insurgents lead by Hassan Hattab split from the GIA in 1998, formed the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC, from Group Salafiste Pour la Prédication et le Combat) began operating as a separate jihadist group in the region.[34] A year later, Hattab persuaded Belmoktar to leave the GIA and join him.[35] Heavily involved in smuggling before joining the GSPC, Belmoktar remained based in the northern Sahara and created networks to transport weapons across the Sahara and into Algeria, Mali, Chad, and Niger for Hattab and the group.36 During this time he was in charges of the GSPC's "ninth region" lead the jihadist expansion out of Algeria and into Mali and Niger.[37]

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{Map: Zones of the GSPC with the ninth region labeled, source: ISS Africa}

During the 2000s, the Algerian-based jihadists began steps towards unification with al-Qaeda.[38] The GSPC succeeded in merging with al-Qaeda in September, 2006, becoming known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[39] By the end of the decade, Belmoktar was a crucial intermediary between the GSPC and al-Qaeda.[40]

Until 2007, Belmoktar remained the commander in control of the desert areas in the south of Algeria, formerly known as the GSPC's ninth region and rebranded as AQIM's "Islamic Emirate of the Sahara."[41] While there, Belmoktar continued his smuggling operations and developed a military network through which the GSPC/AQIM gained transnational footholds, particularly in Mali. During this time, he formed the origins of al-Qaeda in Mauritania, which went on to steal money from the port of Nouakchott in October 2007.[42]

Belmoktar and the Al Mulathameen Brigades split from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in late 2012, in order to aid their operational profile.[43] He was removed from his leadership role within AQIM in October 2012, the result of falling out with AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, and a desire to focus on sub-Saharan countries outside of the Maghreb.[44] In a video released to jihadist forums on December 5, 2012, Belmoktar- named as "the Mujahid Brother Khalid Abu al-Abbas,"[45] announced the brigade's intent to target the interests of countries that oppose the jihadist takeover of North Africa and attempts to implement Shariah law.

Belmoktar's Terrorist Operations As a GSPC/AQIM Leader: 2003- 2011

Belmoktar's international profile began to rise in the 2000s to the extent that his activities during the decade brought significant instability to North Africa and the Sahara. Among his operations, Belmoktar is credited with being vital to the expansion of the jihadist insurgency out of Algeria and into neighboring countries. Notably, his forces carried out attacks on regional garrisons, such as a June 2005 operation against a Mauritanian garrison in El Mreiti, one of the first al-Qaeda linked jihadist operations on Mauritanian soil.[46] The attack killed at least 15 soldiers, and allowed Belmoktar's group to seize weapons from the base.[47]

Already, on November 11, 2003, he was listed by the United Nations as an associate of al-Qaeda.[48] Similarly, in June 2004, a tribunal in Algeria sentenced him in absentia to lifetime imprisonment for forming terrorist groups, robbery, detention, and use of illegal weapons.[49] Belmoktar also increased his engagement in transnational attacks. For example, in 2005, Belmoktar lead an attack on a Mauritanian garrison, killing seventeen soldiers, while go policy of appeasement with local leaders in which both Belmoktar and regional forces avoided armed clashes.[50] Particularly in Mali, Belmoktar worked to build connections with senior state officials as well as among the local community.[51]

His activities during the decade brought significant instability to North Africa and the Sahara. Among his operations, Belmoktar is credited with being critical to the expansion of the jihadist insurgency out of Algeria and into neighboring countries. Notably, his forces carried out attacks on regional garrisons, such as a June 2005 operation against a Mauritanian garrison in El Mreiti, one of the first al-Qaeda linked jihadist operations on Mauritanian soil.[52] The attack killed at least 15 soldiers, and allowed Belmoktar's group to seize weapons from the base.[53]

On December 24, 2007, Belmoktar's men killed four French tourists in Mauritania and injured a fifth in a shooting attack that targeted a family vacationing in the country.[54] The December attack lead to the last-minute cancelation of the 2008 Paris-Dakar Rally race after organizers determined that they would be unable to protect competitors. The race, a nearly month-long endurance event, was scheduled to begin on January 5, 2008 and would have taken competitors through Mauritania during eight of its 15 stages.[55]

Two months after targeting the French tourists, in February 2008, his men attacked the Israeli embassy in the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott, firing weapons at the building.[56] As well, the attackers fired at an nightclub located close to the embassy, injuring two Mauritanians and one French woman.[57]

On February 2, 2011, Mauritania's army foiled an AQIM attempt to assassinate the Mauritanian President and attack the French embassy.[58] Two arrested AQIM fighters confessed to a plan to detonate one car bomb outside of the Mauritanian ministry of defense and the police headquarters and a second outside of the French Embassy in the country.[59] Belmoktar addressed the foiled attack in an November 2011 interview, in which he declared that the explosives-laden cars had traveled through eight states, passed close to military installations, and asserted that the bombers could easily have struck at military targets along the way.[60]

Conclusion: An Experienced and Ambitious Jihadist Leader

Moktar Belmoktar's extensive jihadist background indicates that he is in a position to continue leading the al-Mulathameen Brigades in transnational militancy and insurgency. As his history has demonstrated, Belmoktar and his followers are able to operate around the region, crossing boarders with ease and striking both local and Western targets in multiple countries. Since separating from AQIM, Belmoktar has emphasized his intent to continue to target the interests of those countries that oppose jihadists in north Africa. The attack at In Aménas suggests that his al-Mulathameen jihadist group intends to aggressively seek Western targets and scale up their operations.

In a statement released during the In Aménas attack, the Belmoktar's al-Mulathameen Brigades announced their intent to conduct future attacks and directed Muslims to stay away from Western companies lest they become embroiled in future attacks. The statement, posted online on January 20, 2013 warned: "We stress to our Muslims brothers the necessity to stay away from all the Western companies and complexes for their own safety, and especially the French ones." It continued by threatening additional attacks against countries that are participating in Western military operations in North Africa, claiming "We promise all the countries that participated in the Crusader campaign against the Azawad region that we will carry out more operations if they do not reverse their decision."

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References

[1] http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/19/16580687-1-american-killed-2-escape-in-algeria-hostage-crisis-us-officials-say-militants-seek-to-trade-2-others-for-blind-sheik

[2] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,BFA,,50ee91262,0.html

[3] Two notable exceptions, French citizens Vincent Delory and Antoine De Leocour, were killed within days of their kidnapping, after a failed French and Nigerien attempt to rescue the two men.

[4] https://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI13603E.shtml

[5] http://www.npr.org/2013/01/24/170112260/algeria-attack-a-wake-up-call-for-energy-companies

[6] http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/20/us-sahara-crisis-idUSBRE90F1JJ20130120 and http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/25/algeria-hostage-crisis-death-toll

[7] http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/15/world/17-tourists-abducted-in-sahara-are-freed-in-army-raid.html

[8] http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/15/world/17-tourists-abducted-in-sahara-are-freed-in-army-raid.html

[9] http://www.dw.de/newspaper-berlin-paid-ransom-to-free-hostages/a-1289545

[10] http://www.dw.de/newspaper-berlin-paid-ransom-to-free-hostages/a-1289545

[11] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/world/africa/mokhtar-belmokhtar-thought-to-be-kidnappings-mastermind.html

[12] http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/news/press-releases/2008/plassnik-wolfgang-ebner-and-andrea-kloiber-in-the-care-of-the-malian-authorities.html

[13] http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/diplomat-robert-fowlers-kidnapper-has-powerful-terrorist-links/article1203952/?service=print

[14] http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/diplomat-robert-fowlers-kidnapper-has-powerful-terrorist-links/article1203952/ and http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ransom-paid-for-canadian-diplomats-leaked-cable-suggests/article1893847/

[15] http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/04/30/how-fowlers-freedom-was-bought-letting-other-countries-do-our-dirty-work/

[16] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/9136201/My-130-days-in-the-hands-of-al-Qaedas-African-monsters-by-former-hostage.html

[17] http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/diplomat-robert-fowlers-kidnapper-has-powerful-terrorist-links/article1203952/

[18] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jZeUNcwc7Aro7QDUiMqLSltQ9dAw

[19] http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135964.htm

[20] http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/03/10/spain.aid.worker.freed/index.html

[21] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jZeUNcwc7Aro7QDUiMqLSltQ9dAw

[22] http://www.kiffainfo.net/spip.php?article192

[23] http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/4/30/2012430145241774734Al%20Qaeda%20and%20its%20allies%20in%20the%20Sahel%20and%20the%20Sahara.pdf

[24] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/20/mokhtar-belmokhtar-algeria_n_2515849.html

[25] Note that other jihadist sources identify his year of birth as being 1978, which corresponds to reports that Belmoktar joined the Afghan Arabs when he was 19 years old. See: http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=36993

[26] http://www.kiffainfo.net/spip.php?article192

[27] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/world/africa/mokhtar-belmokhtar-thought-to-be-kidnappings-mastermind.html

[28] http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/photo-shaykh-abdullah-azzam-immediately-following-his-3397/

[29] http://www.kiffainfo.net/spip.php?article192

[30] "Al-Qaida After Ten Years of War" pg 136, information via Al-Majallah, March 14, 1999.
[31] The GIA took up arms in 1992 following the dissolution of Algeria's December 1991 legislative elections. Active until 1998, the GIA participated in a bloody civil war against the Algerian government and struck targets outside of the country, notably French interests.

[32] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34964, from al-Majallah March 14, 1999.

[33] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34964

[34] http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html

[35] "The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al-Qaeda" pg 311

[36] "Le tribunal d'Illizi condamne Belmokhtar à la prison à vie." Le Quotidien D'Oran. June 16, 2004. Accessed at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/mil/groupes_armes/belmokhtar_juge.htm

[37] http://www.kiffainfo.net/spip.php?article192

[38] http://www.kiffainfo.net/spip.php?article192

[39] http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm

[40] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34964

[41] http://www.kiffainfo.net/spip.php?article192

[42] http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/4/30/2012430145241774734Al%20Qaeda%20and%20its%20allies%20in%20the%20Sahel%20and%20the%20Sahara.pdf

[43] http://ent.siteintelgroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&;view=article&id=11062:al-qaeda-official-in-the-sahara-challenges-intervention-calls-for-support&catid=9:multimedia&Itemid=880

[44] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,BFA,,50ee91262,0.html

[45] http://ent.siteintelgroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&;view=article&id=11062:al-qaeda-official-in-the-sahara-challenges-intervention-calls-for-support&catid=9:multimedia&Itemid=880

[46] http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/4/30/2012430145241774734Al%20Qaeda%20and%20its%20allies%20in%20the%20Sahel%20and%20the%20Sahara.pdf

[47] http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a466539.pdf

[48] https://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI13603E.shtml

[49] https://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI13603E.shtml

[50] http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/4/30/2012430145241774734Al%20Qaeda%20and%20its%20allies%20in%20the%20Sahel%20and%20the%20Sahara.pdf

[51] http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/4/30/2012430145241774734Al%20Qaeda%20and%20its%20allies%20in%20the%20Sahel%20and%20the%20Sahara.pdf

[52] http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/4/30/2012430145241774734Al%20Qaeda%20and%20its%20allies%20in%20the%20Sahel%20and%20the%20Sahara.pdf

[53] http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a466539.pdf

[54] http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/17/world/meast/algeria-who-is-belmoktar/index.html

[55] http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/motorsport/world_rally/7171426.stm

[56] http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/17/world/meast/algeria-who-is-belmoktar/index.html

[57] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/01/israelandthepalestinians.angelabalakrishnan

[58] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iZbkDXhCi1XFJfO7G4Xi-ioNjovA?docId=CNG.8c92962f42ad9eaed99e60f1dd4aadf9.2d1

[59] http://magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2011/02/03/feature-02

[60] http://www.kiffainfo.net/spip.php?article192[

 

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Syrian Faction Uses Facebook, Skype to Recruit Fighters

Nov 15, 2013
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The Jund al-Haq (Soldiers of Truth) Brigades, a Syrian militant faction, advertised for…

Facebook Page Reports on Death of Alleged Bulgarian Jihadist In Pakistan

Oct 02, 2013
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A Facebook page dedicated to jihadist fighting uploaded a September 29, 2013 image of a…

Social Network Jihad: Madad News Agency on Facebook

Apr 20, 2012
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Madad News Agency, a jihadist media group that reports from Yemen and acts as an…